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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent regime change literatures compellingly assert that linkage to the 
West has been a significant factor in democratisation where the 
organisational capacity of authoritarian incumbents has overwhelmingly 
weakened pro-democracy forces. Detailed case studies confirming these 
findings have not included Singapore although high levels of linkage to the 
West suggest that democratisation should have taken place there. This 
qualitative case study fills the empirical and theoretical gap by explaining 
why linkage has so far failed to raise the cost of authoritarianism for 
Singapore's government. By eschewing the current structural approach, 
which conceptualises linkage as mere channels of external pressure or 
influence, this analysis treats each dimension of linkage as arenas of 
political interaction where external democratising pressure or influence are 
generated, mediated or precluded. This agency-centred approach exposes 
the politics of linkage and thereby enables us to explain why linkage to the 
West does not always have the expected impact on regime change. These 
findings open up the research agenda of regime change studies by pointing 
the way forward for future studies of otherwise inexplicable cases where 
high linkage has not led to democratisation. 
 
Keywords: Democratisation, authoritarianism, Singapore, linkage, 
Southeast Asia, authoritarian stability 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion that democratisation is for the most part a domestic political 
process exploded when the end of the former Soviet Union corresponded 
with a dramatic sweep of transitions away from communism toward the 
promise of democracy (Whitehead 2001). Early efforts to understand how 
the international environment impacts regime change have since continued, 
re-animated by the fact that a significant number of post-Cold War, "third 
wave" regime transitions have led instead to authoritarian transformations. 
This trend is theoretically significant in that myriad scholarship suggested 
that the overarching post-Cold War geopolitical environment was 
significantly more conducive to democratisation, regional factors 
notwithstanding (Whitehead 2001; Pridham et al. 1994). Exactly how the 
international-domestic political interface shapes divergent regime outcomes 
has remained a question of salience. Arguably, one of the most significant 
contributions in this regard consists of efforts to develop a theory that 
allows us to understand what international factors matter and how they 
matter to regime change. A series of recent scholarship by Levitsky and 
Way (2005; 2006; 2007; 2010), which culminated in a cross-regional, 
medium-N case study in 2010, has made such an impact in the field by 
giving us a framework to approach the complexities of the international 
environment and its impact on regime change. 
The purpose of this article is to re-examine a set of international 
factors that the authors term collectively as "linkage to the West," in order to 
understand why, contrary to their theory, they did not have a 
democratisation effect on Singapore. To understand why this enterprise is of 
any significance will require further elaboration of Levitsky and Way's 
theory and where Singapore fits in their study. Levitsky and Way's theory 
begins by positing that high levels of organisational power, derived from 
state coercive capacity, party strength and state economic control, are key 
domestic factors that inhibit democratisation (2010: 54–70). Authoritarian 
incumbents who enjoy high levels of elite cohesion and coercive state 
capacities can easily thwart oppositional challenges, explaining why many 
promising transitions have culminated in hybrid "electoral authoritarian" 
regimes and changed no further (Levitsky and Way 2010: 54–68). However, 
their medium-N case studies showed that sustained external democratising 
influence provided by linkage to the West contributed significantly to 
democratisation. Defined as ties to or cross-border flows with the West, 
linkage consists of at least six key dimensions—economic, 
intergovernmental, technocratic, informational, social and transnational civil 
society. Economic linkage consists of trade, investment and credit flows. 
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Intergovernmental linkage consists of bilateral diplomatic and military ties 
and participation in Western-led alliances, treaties and international 
organisations whilst technocratic linkages refer to the share of a country's 
elite educated in or with professional ties to Western-led multilateral 
institutions or universities. Informational linkages refer to cross-border 
telecommunications, internet connections, and Western-media penetration. 
Last but not least, social linkages comprise tourism, immigration and 
refugee flows and diaspora networks, whilst transnational civil society 
linkages are tied to international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
churches, party organisations, and other networks (Levitsky and Way 2010: 
43).  
Through process-tracing, their research shows that these forms of 
linkage to the West tilt the balance of power against authoritarian 
incumbents by heightening the salience in the West of authoritarian 
government abuse, increasing the probability of an international response, 
creating domestic constituencies with a stake in adhering to democratic 
norms and ultimately strengthening democratic forces in relation to 
autocrats. It is through these mechanisms that linkage raises the cost of 
authoritarianism, making it imperative for authoritarian incumbents to 
democratise as per oppositional demands. The more extensive linkages are 
maintained to the West, the more likely obstacles of high organisational 
capacity can be overcome. The authors also identify another means through 
which external democratising pressure and influence can be channelled. 
Leverage, defined as the "authoritarian governments' vulnerability to 
external democratising pressure" from the West, is exercised through a 
variety of ways including "political conditionality and punitive sanctions, 
diplomatic pressure, and military intervention." Leverage also raises the cost 
of authoritarianism, but as it tends to provide merely superficial external 
pressure or influence over a limited period of time, its significance is limited 
to cases where the organisational power of incumbents is already low 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 43).  
Levitsky and Way's cases were chosen on the basis of being hybrid 
"competitive authoritarian" regimes, where elections are not free and fair, 
but  allow a minimal degree of political competition such that an electoral 
upset is a possibility (2010: 5). Although they do not claim to offer a general 
theory that applies to all regime types, they do extend their discussion to 
very similar "hegemonic authoritarian" regimes, where even a minimal 
degree of political competition does not exist despite regular elections 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 34; Howard and Roessler 2006: 367). In fact, the 
robustness of their theory is enhanced by the fact that even less competitive 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1–29, 2016                                                      Linkage to the West 
4 
regimes appear mostly to comply with the general predictions of their theory 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 343). The only exception was that of Singapore, a 
hegemonic authoritarian regime "which remained authoritarian despite 
relatively high linkage" (Levitsky and Way 2010: 343). Because Singapore 
was not in the original pool of case studies, no clear explanation was ever 
provided for why it defies predictions. Yet, as Rodan and Jayasuriya point 
out, the case is "starkly at odds with their theory" (Rodan and Jayasuriya 
2012: 181). Since linkage to the West still impacts hegemonic authoritarian 
regimes in the manner predicted by Levitsky and Way's theory, why 
extensive linkage to the West does not work to channel external 
democratising pressure and influence to effect regime change there seems to 
demand some further explanation. Indeed, why Singapore remained immune 
to the zeitgeist of democracy during a period of Western liberal hegemony, 
despite high levels of linkage to the West, is both an empirical and 
theoretical puzzle that needs to be addressed. This is not only because 
students of Singapore's politics would appreciate a clarification as to why 
the case does not "fit" the theory—the case may indeed suggest that 
theoretical refinements may be necessary for a better understanding of the 
international-domestic interface of regime change.  
The analysis provided in this article will centre on Singapore's 
linkages to the West in order to explain why these linkages did not raise the 
cost of authoritarianism for the People's Action Party (PAP) government. 
The first part of this analysis centres on examining the reasons for which 
intergovernmental, economic and technocratic linkages had no effect on 
raising the cost of authoritarianism, whilst informational linkages had only a 
weak impact. I part ways with Levitsky and Way by extending the analysis 
of these linkages into the Cold War period. Levitsky and Way do not do so 
because they "do not expect linkages to have had similar effects during the 
Cold War period" and their theory is "relevant only for periods of Western 
liberal hegemony" (2010: 34). As I will show, such an approach obscures 
important continuities in the way linkages behaved during both periods. 
More importantly, including the Cold War period in the analysis highlights 
the reasons for those continuities, rooted in the consistency of autocratic 
agency and enduring Western interests, Western liberal hegemony 
notwithstanding.  
The second part of the analysis follows logically from the first by 
suggesting that the remaining social and transnational civil society linkages 
had the most potential to raise the cost of authoritarianism in Singapore. 
Indeed, other studies have shown that such linkages are not insignificant 
political arenas in which bottom-up pressures for democratisation can be 
generated to compensate for weak external state pressure, or help to 
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generate external state pressure (Ooi 2009 and 2013). These are empirically 
rich case studies that detail social and transnational civil society linkages as 
interactive arenas in which external democratising pressures are generated. 
Consistent with such an approach, which best foregrounds autocratic agency, 
I trace the ways in which the PAP government has consistently depoliticised 
such social and civil society linkages to minimise the generation of such 
pressures. The analysis focuses in particular on a critical moment in 
Singapore's political history when political opening could have been 
possible (late 1980s and early 1990s), and explains how decisive actions 
taken by the incumbents to crackdown on politicised elements                        
that comprised these social and civil society linkages to the West had a 
lasting depoliticising effect on these linkages.1 This ultimately weakened 
democratic forces and discouraged the development of domestic 
constituencies with a stake in adhering to democratic norms well into the 
post-Cold War period. Wide-ranging social and transnational civil society 
linkages to the West have therefore not raised the cost of authoritarianism 
significantly. 
What emerges from this historical case study is that a conceptual flaw 
in the current theory obscures the politics of linkage and thus inhibits a 
satisfactory explanation for why linkages to the West have failed to raise the 
cost of authoritarianism in a high linkage case like Singapore. By treating 
them as mere channels of external democratising pressure and influence, the 
literature fails to treat linkages as arenas of political interaction where 
external democratising pressure and influence can either be generated, 
minimised or precluded. This overly structural conceptualisation thus 
associates high levels of linkage with high levels of external pressure and 
influence, which this case study suggests is rather contingent upon agency. 
The agency-centred approach used here betters our understanding of the 
international-domestic political interface within which regime change is 
located. In order to situate this analysis in current conversations on regime 
change, we will review how authoritarian stability in Singapore has thus far 
been explained. 
 
 
EXPLAINING AUTHORITATION STABILITY IN SINGAPORE 
 
Singapore has long been a puzzle because it debunks key explanations of 
democratisation—it reached a level of development by the late 1970s that 
Huntington would have called the "political transition zone" without 
experiencing democratic breakthrough (Huntington 1991: 60). The attendant 
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social structural changes predicted by modernisationists—namely, the rise 
of a liberal middle class—did not lead to substantial pressure for 
democratisation (Lipset 1959). While Singapore is empirically and 
theoretically exceptional on many counts, it can be understood through the 
existing theoretical literature on regime change and many studies have "fit" 
it into existing theoretical frameworks so that it is possible to think of 
Singapore meaningfully. For example, the failure of modernisation theory to 
predict authoritarian persistence in Singapore may be understood by 
examining the role of capitalist and working classes and the importance of 
class coalitions (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Collier 1999). 
Trocki (2006) describes how the PAP politically neutered both the local 
capitalist and working classes early on, preventing such strong class 
coalitions from forming, confirming Khong's (1995) earlier observation of 
the political impotence of Singapore's local capitalists in acquiescing to 
authoritarian control for the protection the state could provide against labour 
agitation, and Pereira's (2008) subsequent explanation for its continued 
weakness. More recent class tensions between the middle and lower classes 
have further weakened democratic forces that do exist in Singapore by 
precluding the possibility of large cross sections of opposition (Tan 2004).   
Dimensions of what Levitsky and Way call high organisational 
capacity have also been well-developed explanations for authoritarian 
stability in Singapore. The developmental state literature, for example, has 
suggested that late industrialisation often necessitates a "hard state" which 
exercises societal control with significant authoritarian overtones (Johnson 
1982; Woo-Cumings 1999). In the case of Singapore, the hard 
developmental state had already been shaped by the "counterrevolutionary 
collaboration between British and local elites under late-colonial rule during 
the 1940s and 1950s" (Slater 2012). Its development during the Cold War 
and when the Indonesian threat to national security seemed imminent had 
the effect of further hardening it. Such state-society relations continue to 
exist in Singapore even in the post-industrial age (Rodan 1989; Huff 1994). 
Indeed, Slater (2012) attributes authoritarian durability in Singapore to the 
continued existence of the strong state. The coercive aspects of state 
capacity are further maintained by archaic laws such as the Internal Security 
Act (ISA), and a legal system effectively controlled by the executive and 
therefore rules consistently against opposition politicians and activists in 
"defamation" cases. 
Party strength has also contributed to authoritarian stability in 
Singapore—it is a case consistent with the statistical findings of Geddes that 
single party regimes last longer than personalist and military ones (1999: 
122). The high level of elite cohesion in Singapore certainly confirms the 
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regime stabilising effect of parties and the resultant claim that single-party 
regimes tend to be brought down by exogenous events and not internal splits 
(Huntington 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Smith 2005; Brownlee 
2007). Further, Slater (2012) has shown that the cohesion of a broad 
spectrum of political, economic and social elites is very much forged by 
recognised threats to their shared interests from class and communal sources. 
Mass mobilisation and conflict along class and communal lines between 
1945 and 1965 is said to have led to the "ordering" of elites even before 
Indonesia's Konfrontasi campaign of 1963–1965 made geopolitical 
vulnerability a significant source of Singapore's "insecurity complex." 
(Rahim 2009). To this conversation on elite cohesion, Levitsky and Way 
(2012) have added an ideational dimension, forged often through the shared 
experience of violence. In Singapore's post World War II history, counter-
insurgency efforts, communal violence and later, security threats from 
without (Konfrontasi) helped to consolidate a generation of leadership with 
what Levitsky and Way call "extraordinary legitimacy and unquestioned 
authority," despite the lack of nationalist heroism—helping to explain the 
relative lack of factional conflict within the PAP (Levitsky and Way 2012: 
871). On top of its monopolistic control over the (coercive) state apparatus, 
it is this elite cohesion that has been an important source of the PAP's ability 
to maintain "party strength." With the aid of the first-past-the-post electoral 
system, this has led to the PAP's predominance in Parliament, which has 
further allowed the PAP to develop legalistic means of punishment for those 
who do not comply. 
The above literatures suggest that coercive state capacity and party 
strength have been mutually reinforcing, creating tremendous obstacles for 
democratisation. The literatures on the evolution of Singapore's 
"developmental state" also help to explain the extensive control the party-
state has on the economy, however, not least through government-linked or 
government-linked corporations (GLCs), which have directly competed 
with local private interests after 1965 along with foreign-owned companies, 
and numerous statutory boards (Trocki 2006; Rodan and Hewison 2001). 
The numerous GLCs are a key source of employment for Singaporeans. 
Further, the party-government's control over private savings and capital has 
been exercised through GLCs such as the Development Bank of Singapore, 
which remains only partially privatised today (Rodan 2004). Importantly, 
economic control is also extended through that of the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF)—the government-controlled compulsory savings program—
which is also a large source of financing for the majority of the population's 
purchase of the Housing Development Board's expansive public housing. 
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Key means of production and finance are therefore under the PAP 
government's control, and this control furnishes its ability to extend political 
control through myriad organisations from the media to grassroots 
committees. On all three fronts—coercive state capacity, party strength and 
economic control—the incumbent PAP regime thus maintains a high level 
of organisational capacity. 
This literature survey suggests that authoritarian stability in Singapore 
should not, in fact, come as a surprise. Why extensive linkages to the West 
have not raised the cost of authoritarianism for the PAP government despite 
its high organisational capacity is still something that needs to be explained, 
however. In this regard, Rodan and Jayasuriya suggest that Levitsky and 
Way's inability to do so lies in the failure to understand how "capitalist 
development fundamentally influences the nature of societal forces and the 
conflicts between them" and forges "consensus politics" (2012: 181). This is 
not a significant departure from the literatures cited earlier, which highlight 
the political neutering of capitalist and working classes in Singapore. 
Importantly, a "social foundations approach" like theirs does better capture 
how the fusion of state and party created a new class of politico-bureaucrats 
"predisposed toward more bureaucratic and administrative techniques of 
political control and mobilisation, but also a form of state capitalism that 
rendered many Singaporeans directly or indirectly dependent on the state for 
economic and social resources," thus fostering "vulnerability to political co-
optation and intimidation" (Rodan and Jayasuriya  2012: 186). Indeed, 
systemic exposure to "an institutionalised ideology that champions the role 
of technocratic elites at the expense of ideas of representation and 
citizenship rights" helps to explain why democratic forces in Singapore lack 
a strong social base to mount their opposition to authoritarian rule (Rodan 
and Jayasuriya 2012: 186). Altogether, these socio-structural factors help us 
to understand that we cannot simply assume that authoritarian regimes like 
Singapore would ever democratise. 
It is important to note that the focus of their explanation of 
authoritarian stability in Singapore is on the inherent character of the regime, 
forged through a particular path of capitalist development it took. Their 
analysis of the socio-structural factors of "consensus politics" in Singapore 
does not include an explanation of exactly how these domestic factors 
mediate the democratising impact of linkages to the West, however. 
Although their analysis is directed at Levitsky and Way's failure to explain 
the case of Singapore, there remains a sense that their approach still 
sidesteps the issue by reasserting the primacy of domestic factors in 
accounting for authoritarian stability. How these factors impact the politics 
of linkage and contribute to the failure to raise the cost of authoritarianism is 
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still obscure. It is for this reason that this analysis focuses explicitly on the 
linkages themselves. 
 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOCRATIC AND 
INFORMATIONAL LINKAGES TO THE WEST 
 
In Levitsky and Way's work linkage to the West is conceptualised as 
"transmitters of international influence," or neutral channels through which 
external democratising influences flow (2010: 44). Instead of treating the six 
dimensions of linkage collectively as mere channels for external 
democratising pressures and influence, I analyse each dimension of linkage 
in order to highlight the politics that underpin each form of linkage. By  
doing so I develop my argument that the structural nature of the original 
conceptualisation is a failure to understand linkages to the West as sources 
of political pressure and influence, dislocating from analysis arenas of 
interaction where such pressures are generated, mediated or precluded. 
Table 1, which specifies the content of linkages as they apply to Singapore, 
also summarises the impact that various dimensions of linkage to the West 
have had on raising the cost of authoritarianism. 
The extent of intergovernmental linkages Singapore maintains with 
the West is well documented in myriad literatures and will not be elaborated 
on here (Gillis 2005). Singapore is an active participant in 49 regional and 
Western-led international organisations to date and despite its declaration of 
nonalignment in the 1960s, was supportive of Western-led alliances during 
the Cold War (Leifer 1986). In all areas, perhaps with the exception of 
human rights, Singapore has played by international rules of the game. The 
PAP government quickly established itself as the West's best bet against 
communism on the island to the UK and US. Precisely because of the 
leadership's positioning of Singapore in its geopolitical relationship to the 
West, the latter has historically never had any vested interest in undermining 
a stable, pro-West government whose existence in a Malay Muslim region 
already seemed at times precarious. Despite the refusal to be openly 
identified as a US ally and occasionally criticising US policy in the region, 
Singapore was a consistent advocate for US military presence in the region 
during the Cold War, faithfully servicing US warships and providing 
training for Vietnamese officers during the Vietnam War (Guan 2009). 
Today, such a symbiotic intergovernmental relationship that serves the 
American national interest continues to exist as the US rebalances to the 
Asia Pacific—four littoral combat ships will be deployed there by 2018 as 
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tensions with China in the South China Sea builds (The Diplomat 19 
February 2015). It is also for these reasons that there has historically been 
no perceptible effort to either generate pressure on the PAP government or 
influence the politics of Singapore through such intergovernmental linkages. 
 
Table 1: Linkage to the West and its effect on raising the cost of authoritarianism. 
 
Dimensions of Linkage Effect on Raising Cost of Authoritarianism 
Intergovernmental Linkage 
(Bilateral diplomatic and military ties; participation 
in Western-led alliances, treaties and international 
organisations) 
None 
Economic Linkage 
(Trade, investment and credit flows) None 
Technocratic Linkage 
(Western educated elites with professional ties to 
Western-led multilateral institutions or universities) 
None 
Informational Linkage 
(Western media penetration, internet) Weak 
Social Linkage 
(Student and diaspora networks) Weak 
Transnational Civil Society Linkage 
(International human rights NGOs, international 
legal professional organisations, churches) 
Weak 
 
Similarly, economic linkages have failed to raise the cost of 
authoritarianism in Singapore because it did not serve Western interests to 
generate significant democratising pressure on the PAP government. The 
cornerstone of the PAP's development strategy had been to provide 
generous tax breaks, first class legal, financial and physical infrastructure, 
an efficient bureaucracy and a highly skilled, English-speaking workforce to 
attract foreign direct investment. The PAP's brand of capitalism and its 
control over society yielded a stable investment environment that worked 
for Western economic and political interests.2 The adroitness of Singapore's 
economy is often attributed in the West to the capabilities of the PAP 
leadership—supported by the social docility cultivated under strongman rule. 
In the post-Cold War, post-industrial period, the PAP has preserved the 
continuity of such foreign economic interests by reorienting toward a 
"knowledge economy" (Finegold et al. 2004).  
Further, Singapore's "economic miracle" was useful to the West in the 
ideological dimensions of the Cold War. In the Cold War and early post-
Cold War context, Singapore stood as a shining example of how economic 
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linkages to the West and free market capitalism can emancipate nations 
from underdevelopment or stagnation. Singapore's economic tsar Dr. Goh 
Keng Swee positioned the country as a potential model for emulation to the 
developing world when he stated, "If our experience can be used as a 
general guide to policy in other developing countries, the lesson is that the 
free enterprise system, correctly nurtured and adroitly handled, can serve as 
a powerful and versatile instrument of economic growth" (Goh 1999). 
Although Singapore's leadership often challenged notions of democracy and 
human rights norms associated with the West, such suggestions on the 
economic front lent itself to the ideological ascendency of the West during 
both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and further underlined the 
benefits of economic linkage to the West. Singapore also served the wider 
Western agenda of reorienting China when Dr. Goh served as the economic 
advisor to the State Council of China on coastal development between 1985 
and 1995 (Gill et al. 2006). This has meant that the West is incentivised to 
refrain from exerting pressure on the PAP government to any significant 
extent. Singapore's apparent modernity and the lack of repression at a 
notable scale from the late 1970s onward has made it possible for Western 
governments to largely ignore the authoritarian nature of the PAP's rule, of 
which they have been well aware.3 
As intergovernmental and economic linkages to the West precluded 
the generation of Western pressure in general, technocratic channels for 
such pressures were virtually redundant. As an arena where Western 
pressure or influence can be generated, technocratic linkages warrant further 
discussion, however. Western pressure or influence over Singapore's 
technocrats tended to be limited because Singapore came to represent 
technical-bureaucratic rationality par excellence, often perceived as an 
exemplar of corruption-free governance in the eyes of the West. The 
pragmatism of the leadership also allowed for judicious state intervention in 
the economy—which came to gain respect in technocratic circles of 
international organisations like the World Bank in the 1990s as the East 
Asian developmental state model began to gain currency (Birdsall et al. 
1993). Moreover, the propensity of Singapore's government to exercise 
fiscal prudence made it attractive to economic conservatives amongst the 
technocratic and political elites of the West. The outpouring of praise from 
heads of state in the West following former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's 
recent passing is telling of their admiration for the strongman rule that laid 
the social basis for that technical-bureaucratic rationality (Cram 2015).  
It is important to note, however, that although Western influence was 
not forthcoming at the technocratic level, this dimension of linkage has not 
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so far served to create domestic constituencies with a stake in adhering to 
democratic norms in part because the success of the "Singapore model" 
helped to instil a degree of pride in Singaporeans, reinforced by the 
admiration of foreign technocrats that have visited to learn about 
Singapore's "model" of development (Tan 2015). Of course, many of the 
students who went abroad to study at institutions of higher education in the 
UK and US were largely government sponsored from the late 1970s onward, 
and their future (well-paid) careers were predicated on the assumption of 
loyalty to the party-government (Wah Piow Tan, interview 18 December 
2007).4 However, there is an ideational dimension that cannot be discounted. 
Singapore's economic success has allowed the "institutionalised ideology 
that champions the role of technocratic political elites," as Rodan and 
Jayasuriya (2012) have pointed out, to forge a strong identity amongst 
themselves and the wider middle classes employed by state apparatus or 
industries related to the state. The logic of technical-bureaucratic rationality 
continued to frame the reorientation strategy toward the knowledge 
economy in the 1990s, reinforcing this ideology (Leong 2011). As the West 
continues to ignore, for the most part, the authoritarian aspects of 
Singapore's state capitalism, technocratic linkages are unlikely to be a 
source of Western influence that creates constituencies with a state in 
adhering to democratic norms, or indeed, become an arena where external 
pressure that strengthens democratic forces in Singapore is generated. 
 Last in this discussion is that of informational linkages to the West, 
which potential to raise the cost of authoritarianism is twofold. Outward 
flows of information on authoritarian abuse from Singapore to the West can 
heighten its salience there and increase the probability of an international 
response. Inward flows of information from the West on the virtues of—
Western liberal values, ideas and institutions can create domestic 
constituencies with a stake in adhering to domestic norms by, for example, 
framing problems such as the lack of accountability as a symptom of 
authoritarian rule. Whilst telecommunications technologies in the 1970s and 
1980s lent themselves more easily to censorship, such infrastructure has 
been well established for international commercial reasons. Control of 
Western-media penetration in Singapore was much tighter in the 1970s and 
1980s, and subject to more effective censorship from time to time before the 
advent of the internet. Since informational linkage to the West was 
unavoidable, however, the PAP leadership's strategy has been to 
circumscribe the content related to the authoritarian nature of Singapore's 
government as much as possible. The 1986 Newspaper and Printing Presses 
(Amendment) Act was thus introduced to provide the government the right 
to restrict the circulation of foreign publications deemed to engage in the 
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domestic affairs of Singapore (Seow 1998). The numerous defamation suits 
filed against international news agencies and foreign journalists critical of 
its authoritarian rule in the compliant courtrooms of Singapore is also part 
of this strategy. Although this prong of the PAP's strategy really began with 
intensity during the late 1980s and 90s, it has carried on into the 2000s.5 Of 
course, this had the effect of advertising the authoritarian nature of the PAP 
government to the West, suggesting that the PAP leadership was most 
interested in mediating the effects of the inward flow of information in the 
age of Western liberal hegemony. It is in such an ideological context that 
the "Asian values" discourse promulgated by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
should also be understood as yet another prong of the PAP's strategy to 
mediate the impact of informational linkages with the West (Zakaria 1994). 
Indeed, the inevitability of such linkages necessitated an "Asian values" 
counter-discourse founded on the self-confidence of the pre-1997 
"economic miracle."  
Informational linkages have, indeed, heightened the salience in the 
West of authoritarian government abuse, not least because of the PAP 
leadership's strategy to shape the content of the information flowing into 
Singapore from the West. That this did not increase the likelihood of an 
international response and help to generate external pressure requires that 
we reference the intergovernmental and economic linkages that 
disincentivised Western governments from strong reactions to crackdowns 
on media freedom. Informational linkages are nevertheless considered to 
have had some limited impact in creating domestic constituencies with a 
stake in adhering to democratic norms. Between the late 1980s and early 
1990s, whether and how Singapore should liberalise in response to the 
zeitgeist of democracy sweeping through various regions of the world, 
including East Asia, became a concern of the government, reflecting the 
perceived need to forestall the possibility of anything resembling a people 
power movement. It has not been possible to truncate informational linkages 
with the West for commercial reasons, nor to successfully circumscribe the 
inflow of information, such that Western liberal democratic ideas and values 
would not take some hold. This has, indeed, become much more difficult 
since the widespread use of the internet, but is associated, of course, with 
extensive social linkages to the West. 
That neither technocratic, intergovernmental and economic linkages 
to the West have raised the cost of authoritarianism by generating and 
channelling external pressure or influence is evidenced, amongst other 
things, by the way in which Western-led international organisations have 
not hesitated to hold its meetings in Singapore. For example, in 2006, 
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President Wolfowitz criticised the PAP government for banning protests 
during the World Bank meeting, yet a steady working relationship continued 
(New York Times 15 September 2006). Informational linkages have had 
some impact in raising the cost of authoritarianism by helping to make 
Singaporeans aware of how accountability and responsiveness can be at 
stake when such institutions are not strong, especially in recent years. 6 This, 
however, is the extent of Western influence, as there has been no intent on 
the part of the West to take further action to undermine the stability and 
durability of a regime that has served Western interests so well. This 
agency-centred approach helps us to better perceive the enduring political 
and economic interests of the West at play with policies and actions of the 
PAP leadership to preclude and mediate the potential impact of these 
dimensions of linkage. 
As such, we turn our attention now to social and civil society linkages. 
Our analysis so far implies that the grassroots nature of these forms of 
linkage may offer a greater potential in heightening the salience of 
authoritarian government abuse to the West, increase the probability of an 
international response and strengthening democratic forces in relation to 
autocrats. Other detailed empirical studies have shown that social and 
transnational civil society actors that make up such linkages have in other 
cases generated external pressures that have helped to effect democratisation 
in Taiwan and South Korea by framing authoritarian abuses as human rights 
violations (Ooi 2009; 2013). Indeed, the Helsinki Process (1973–1975) 
brought about an international normative shift where human rights became a 
legitimate international concern that could affect interstate relations. 
Transnational human rights organisations proliferated worldwide, 
empowered by this new normative environment to frame authoritarian abuse 
as morally reprehensible human rights violations that required international 
censure (Thomas 2001). Despite such a favourable normative environment, 
social and civil society actors that attempted to generate external 
democratising pressure by appealing to the moral conscience of the West 
nevertheless failed in Singapore. The approach taken in the following 
analysis foregrounds the politics of such forms of linkage by taking a 
similarly agency-centred approach. The rich empirical details in this section 
reveal social and transnational civil society linkages as arenas of political 
interaction—where grassroots actors work to generate external 
democratising pressures whilst the target government takes action to 
preclude and resist such pressures. This approach, as we shall see, better 
explains why such social and transnational civil society linkages failed to 
raise the cost of authoritarianism appreciably. By highlighting the role of 
autocratic agency in mediating the impact of such linkages, we further 
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understand why the quantity of linkages matters less than the nature of these 
linkages. 
 
 
SOCIAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY LINKAGES TO THE WEST 
 
Social and transnational civil society linkages were extensive and diffuse in 
the case of Singapore precisely because its colonial history created a pattern 
of population flows with the West that spread these transnational networks 
thin. Political exiles and emigrants could be found in many English-
speaking Western countries such as UK, Canada, US, Australia and New 
Zealand but the globalised outlook of Singapore society also helped to 
establish linkages to other Western European countries. Importantly, the 
diffuse pattern of social and transnational civil society linkages rendered 
them vulnerable to disruption at key historical moments by the PAP 
government. Further, actions taken to disrupt such linkages in the short run 
had the longer term impact of depoliticising the actors that make up such 
linkages, concomitant with efforts to do so with domestic civil society. 
Indeed, the depoliticisation of social and transnational civil society 
linkages is not divorced from the PAP government's longstanding 
management of society (Lee 2005). This process is well recorded and 
analysed by others, who have shown that the general quiescence of the 
1960s and 1970s could not be replicated in the 1980s and 1990s, however, 
and outright repression had to be replaced by co-optive methods that 
nevertheless subordinated "civic society" to the state agenda thereafter (Koh 
and Ooi 2004). What is often missed is the management of the relationships 
that are formed between societal groups that provide "alternative 
constructions of the 'truths' of societal situations" and solidarist associations 
or movements abroad, which had the potential to heighten the salience in the 
West of authoritarian government abuse, increase the probability of an 
international response, or strengthen the political opposition (Chua 2000). 
Where such groups express sympathies or openly support the PAP's political 
competitors, they are treated as potential rival centres of power and dealt 
with accordingly. For example, following the Helsinki Process, one of the 
more prominent Catholic activists in Singapore, Father Patrick Goh, 
attempted to set up a Human Rights Committee opposed to detention 
without trial and other arbitrary restrictions of freedom. This committee, 
established in 1977 as transnational human rights networks proliferated 
worldwide, consisted of the political opposition previously detained under 
the ISA.  Because of the leftist leanings of those involved, this initiative was 
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alleged to be a front organisation for a communist revival and quickly 
disbanded (Amnesty International 1978). From then on, only ecumenical 
organisations that avoided challenging the PAP government and its policies 
or supporting the political opposition were allowed to exist. The precedent 
that this episode of repression set, along with a decade of spectacular 
economic growth, led to a period of social quiescence. 
By 1981, J. B. Jeyaretnam of the Workers' Party became the first 
opposition politician to be elected into Parliament since 1965. Importantly, a 
group of liberal minded lawyers, Christian social workers, student leaders 
and other members of the professional middle class critical of various 
aspects of government policy began to join or show sympathy to the 
opposition Workers' Party. By 1984, the growing electoral strength of the 
opposition became more apparent, as two opposition candidates were 
elected to Parliament and the PAP garnered only 62 percent of the vote in 
the general election of that year. By the mid-1980s, civic organisations that 
challenged state orthodoxy, such as the Association of Action and Research 
for Women (AWARE), also began to appear. Although the political 
opposition remained weak, by the late 1980s the possibility of political 
change presented itself in the form of the zeitgeist of democracy, which 
seemed to have swept across the globe. Importantly, a new generation of 
leaders in the ruling PAP was poised to take the reins at around the same 
time—and had hinted at the possibility of a new era of political 
liberalisation in keeping with these international trends. These international 
and domestic developments thus encouraged a nucleus of dissension to form, 
bringing together independent social activists and the political opposition. 
Two important breeding grounds for extra-parliamentary political 
opposition emerged in the 1980s—the Law Society and the Catholic Church. 
Many of their members were Western-educated, and maintained social, 
professional and organisational ties to the West, sometimes via parts of Asia 
which had more liberal political environments or had experienced people 
power movements. In other words, politicised social and transnational civil 
society linkages were forming. 
It was thus in May 1987 that the PAP government dramatically 
revealed that they had smashed a transnational network of Christian 
ecumenical organisations and lawyers with links to international human 
rights organisations and certain student activists abroad. These were 
accused of being Marxists who planned to violently overthrow the 
government and establish a socialist order in Singapore. To date, scholars 
have failed to understand Operation Spectrum as an attack on transnational 
civil society and social linkages to the West—politicising over a period of 
time—that could have strengthened the political opposition by lending them 
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international support (Barr 2008). Yet, the words of then-Home Affairs 
Minister Jayakumar betray this intent, "The Government could have decided 
let's wait, don't do anything. Wait for two, three years… But that means that 
the network would have proliferated (New York Times 21 June 1987).  
Indeed, dissent from within the legal profession was particularly 
troublesome to the PAP government precisely because lawyers were 
conversant with the legal means of political repression and societal control, 
and had connections with international human rights organisations that were 
focused on the rule of law. One of the first signs of resistance to 
authoritarian rule came in 1986, when the Law Society publicly criticised 
amendments that were made to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act to 
restrict the foreign press from circulating reports on political issues in 
Singapore—an attempt to manage informational linkages to the West. In 
January 1986, an independent-minded former Attorney General, Francis 
Seow, became president of the Law Society and under his tenure the Society 
demanded that the body be consulted on a a variety of judicial and legal 
appointments. At the LAWASIA Biennial Conference on 29 June 1987, for 
example, he appealed to "concerned and caring international 
organizations… to exert pressure on the Singapore government to put [the 
accused] on trial in a court of law or release them" (Seow 1994: 137). Such 
appeals did not fall on deaf ears—some 200 organisations worldwide 
protested the detention of the 22 individuals rounded up in Operation 
Spectrum, much to the chagrin of the PAP government and possibly a 
reason for which most of them were not long released despite the leeway for 
indefinite detention provided by the ISA (The Straits Times 27 June 1987).  
Seow was a particular threat to authoritarian continuity in Singapore 
at this time of leadership transition. Forced to resign from the office of Law 
Society president, he joined the Workers' Party in August 1988 to contest 
the September general elections. Crowds gathered in significant numbers 
during Workers' Party campaign rallies and the PAP won by only a very 
narrow margin in Eunos Constituency. Interestingly, Seow was later 
arrested under the ISA for being a willing partner to "foreign interference" 
in Singapore's internal affairs in some unspecified plot to undermine the 
PAP government (New York Times 21 June 1987). Specifically, US 
diplomats, including Mason Hendrickson, were accused of meddling in 
Singapore politics by encouraging Seow to enter politics, while Seow was 
accused of receiving monies from the American government and seeking to 
secure the possibility of political asylum in the US should there be reprisals 
for challenging the PAP (Seow 1994: 121–45). These accusations highlight 
the importance placed by the PAP government on truncating transnational 
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civil society and social linkages that could strengthen the political 
opposition. 
This particular episode strained US-Singapore relations at the time 
(New York Times 12 May 1988). While transnational civil society and social 
linkages to the West had already helped to create the outpouring of 
international disapproval for the crackdown on Seow and the "Marxist 
conspirators," such accusations compelled US Secretary of State Schultz to 
discuss the case with Singapore officials, implying that private diplomatic 
pressure could have been applied at this time (New York Times 21 June 
1987). There were no further repercussions down the road as economic and 
intergovernmental cooperation continued, however. Amnesty International 
nevertheless named Seow (and later, all 22 detainees of Operation Spectrum) 
a "prisoner of conscience" to highlight his plight and upon release, Human 
Rights Watch invited him to the US, where he has remained since 
November 1988 to publish three books to continue raising the profile of the 
PAP government's brand of authoritarian rule in the West (Associated Press 
22 August 1988; Seow 1994: 256).  
Connections that local lawyers had with international human rights 
organisations such as the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) was also 
troublesome because the ICJ kept a close eye on the use of law for 
repressive purposes in Singapore, and had in the past even helped to procure 
external counsel in defamation cases, periodically filed by the PAP 
leadership against the parliamentary opposition to bankrupt and disqualify 
them from their seat. The ICJ sent a fact-finding mission to Singapore in 
July 1987, interviewing Seow, opposition parliamentarian J. B. Jeyaretnam, 
and the family and friends of those "Marxist conspirators," presenting their 
findings in a publicly circulated report that discredited the PAP 
government's claims of a Marxist conspiracy (New York Times 21 June 
1987). The ICJ also invited Seow to a conference in Bangkok in December 
1987 and June 1988 to further raise international awareness of political 
repression in Singapore. Other organisations such as the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (later, Human Rights First) and the 
International Human Rights Law Group also served as expert witnesses 
during US Congressional Hearings over the human rights situation in 
Singapore, which took place as a result of urgings by human rights activists 
during this times. 7  In short, linkage to these international human rights 
organisations not only heightened the salience in the West of authoritarian 
government abuse, it strengthened a nascent opposition movement.  
Indeed, efforts to raise the international profile of Operation Spectrum 
did in fact help to generate some external pressure on the PAP 
government—the US Congress and even the European Parliament called for 
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the immediate release of the ISA detainees, or an open trial (New York 
Times 21 June 1987). Members of the New Zealand Parliament expressed 
public concern in April 1988, as did members of the Japanese Diet, when 
rearrests were made of those who had been previously released in 1987 
(Rerceretnam 2006). These concerns were raised precisely because of the 
outcry stirred up by human rights activists, Christian churches and 
ecumenical organisations abroad, along with student bodies that objected to 
the use of the ISA to crack down on seemingly innocent individuals. 
However, Western countries did not use other heavy handed approaches 
such as economic sanctions to exert pressure on the PAP government, 
consistent with the earlier claim that Western economic and political 
interests vested in the Singapore leadership did, in fact, disincentivise an 
outright campaign to delegitimise the PAP government. Activists from such 
international human rights organisations would soon find themselves closely 
observed or obstructed from entering Singapore. The PAP government also 
disrupted these linkages by making an example of those who tried to 
establish contact with any kind of foreigners that could help to generate 
external pressure at this time—lawyer Patrick Seong, for example, was 
labelled a "propagandist" and later detained simply for providing 
information to the foreign press during the 1987 arrests (The Online Citizen 
26 May 2009). Another way the PAP government disrupted those linkages 
was by framing the international support given to the ISA detainees as 
"foreign interference" in the domestic affairs of Singapore, making it clear 
to social activists, the political opposition and all potential dissidents in 
Singapore that any foreign support they gained would be considered a threat 
to national security and treated accordingly (Seow 1994: 107). Such moves 
had the dual effect of immediately causing independently-constituted civil 
society groups to dissociate themselves in the short term from their Western 
counterparts, while depoliticising them in the longer run. 
Another important source of potential opposition during the 1980s 
came from within Christian ecumenical organisations. Ten of the original 16 
detainees of Operation Spectrum had worked for Catholic ecumenical 
organisations concerned with issues of social justice and human rights, or 
were members of Catholic student organisations with connections to other 
such organisations abroad (Barr 2008: 228–46). Indeed, the "Marxist" 
aspect of the alleged conspiracy referenced in part the history of progressive 
social activism of the targeted Christian groups in Singapore and in part 
"liberation theology," which had more recently played a role in the 
democratic breakthrough in South Korea and the Philippines (Straits Times 
20 August 1987; Richburg 1987). This growing Christian movement was, in 
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fact, increasingly multidenominational and thus potentially broad-based. 
Even more worrying for the PAP government were their linkages to similar 
organisations across Western societies, which support could strengthen the 
political opposition. The Christian Conference of Asia (CCA), which was 
shut down because of its support of the "Marxist conspirators," was just 
such an example of a regional, multidenominational ecumenical 
organisation linked to a larger international organisation, the World Council 
of Churches (WCC).   
Indeed, numerous church and ecumenical leaders in Australia and 
Japan, South Korea and other places in Asia such as the Philippines, 
protested Operation Spectrum and advocated for the release of those 
detained without prospect of trial (O'Grady 1990: 13–22). The CCA further 
mounted a campaign against the arrests of the "Marxist conspirators" from 
its subsidiary bodies in Hong Kong and some of its member Councils of 
Churches (Rerceretnam 2006: 20). Further, the Asian Human Rights 
Commission, linked to the CCA, sent a fact-finding mission in July 1987 
along with the ICJ, which concluded in its report that those detained should 
be "defended and applauded" (Asian Human Rights Commission 1987: 27). 
The CCA also financially supported the ad hoc Emergency Committee for 
Human Rights in Singapore (ECHRS), based in Christchurch, New Zealand, 
which produced fortnightly newsletters between May 1987 and October 
1988 to publicise and inform on Operation Spectrum. The Ecumenical News 
Service of the World Council of Churches carried news of the crackdowns 
abroad while in May 1988, recommendations were made at the Churches 
Commission on International Affairs—an advisory body of the WCC—that 
the WCC boycott Singapore Airlines when rearrests were made the month 
before (O'Grady 1990: 13–22). The WCC did just that. In the midst of such 
external pressure, the PAP leadership was determined to crush the 
progressive Catholic leadership which had reaffirmed the need for the 
Church to engage in issues of social justice, support the detainees and was 
receptive of international support. Four such Catholic priests were pressured 
into resigning after a meeting with Prime Minister Lee was held with the 
Catholic leadership. The Archbishop was later compelled to issue 
ecclesiastical sanctions on them and to shut down the Catholic Center. 
These priests left separately for Europe, Canada and Australia, effectively 
disrupting this aspect of transnational civil society linkages to the West at 
the time. 
Social linkages to the West, in the particular form of Singaporean 
students and political exiles living abroad, were also targeted by the PAP 
government because of their potential to generate and channel external 
pressure or influence on the new generation of PAP leaders. Tan Wah Piow, 
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named the sinister mastermind of the "Marxist Conspiracy," was at the time 
a law student at Oxford University after having been forced to leave the 
country for anti-Vietnam war student activism in the 1970s. Tan led the 
Federation of United Kingdom and Eire Malaysian and Singapore Students' 
Organizations (FUEMSSO) and was viewed as a threat precisely because 
his position gave him the potential to politicise and influence returning 
students. The Hong Kong-based Asian Students Association (ASA), which 
maintained connections to FUEMSSO, was also held in suspicion for 
politicising returning students.8 Further, a connection between the Catholic 
progressive movement, Tan, and local students was apparently appearing. 
Thus, many of the ISA detainees had been members of the Polytechnic 
Students' Union involved with Catholic ecumenical organisations or 
members of the Catholic Association of Polytechnic Students. Operation 
Spectrum disrupted these social linkages and the potential they had to 
nurture and support the political opposition in Singapore. Indeed, Tan and 
other former student activists based in Hong Kong and Europe formed the 
European Committee on Human Rights in Malaysia and Singapore 
(KEHMA-S) to protest Operation Spectrum, vindicating PAP suspicions of 
these transnational networks' ability to generate external pressure and bring 
it to bear on them.9 
However, what the PAP government may not have grasped was that 
the students most active in generating external pressure would be based in 
Australia, since fewer of them were dependent upon government 
scholarships. An important student organisation that actively objected to 
Operation Spectrum was collectively known as the Network of Overseas 
Student Collectives in Australia (NOSCA). Interestingly, NOSCA 
maintained extensive links with regional and international nongovernmental 
organisations organised around causes that spanned across a wide range of 
issue areas, making them particularly well-connected. NOSCA organised 
the Malaysia Singapore Human Rights Commission, held public meetings 
about the "Marxist Conspiracy," published literature, ran media campaigns 
and lobbied other student organisations and Australian politicians to support 
the detainees of Operation Spectrum over 1987–1988. These efforts 
prompted the Australian government to raise the issue at a regional foreign 
ministers' meeting (US State Department 1982: 798). In 1989, NOSCA even 
staged a public protest in Sydney to embarrass visiting Brigadier-General 
Lee Hsien Loong. It is not surprising that the PAP government publicly 
acknowledged that the greatest degree of external pressure came from 
nongovernmental organisations based in Australia (The Straits Times 27 
June 1987).  
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The 1987 arrests served as a focal point for the above transnational 
civil society and social actors to converge their efforts on heightening the 
salience in the West of authoritarian government abuse and to increase the 
probability of an international response. This was an important moment in 
Singapore's political history because the impending leadership transition 
could have sensitised the leadership to external pressure. Owing to actions 
taken to truncate these linkages, only limited pressure could be generated, 
however. Efforts to depoliticise civil society and other social actors and 
their linkages to the West had a lasting impact into the post-Cold War 
period, explaining why these linkages have not since generated any 
appreciable external pressure that could have raised the cost of 
authoritarianism for the PAP government. Although inherent structural 
weaknesses rendered these forms of linkage to the West susceptible, the 
deliberate policy of the PAP to depoliticise these linkages is a significant 
factor for which they have not had the kind of impact suggested by the 
current literature. 
Indeed, subsequent to Operation Spectrum, the PAP government 
began vigorously shaping the discourse on civil society by redefining it as 
"civic society" (Lee 2005). Brigadier General George Yeo's 1991 
promulgation of the term "civic society" stressed civic responsibilities rather 
than the rights of citizenship, whilst the subsequent policy of marginalising 
a handful of groups that refused to be so co-opted effectively depoliticised 
civil society and subordinated it to state preferences. Under Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong, the term "civil society" was reintroduced with little 
appreciable difference in substance to the earlier understanding. Importantly, 
the "Marxist Conspiracy" debacle etched in public memory the dangers of 
politicised linkages with the West, and the many international 
nongovernmental organisations in Singapore today are also mindful of the 
parameters of operation. An example of one organisation with social and 
civil society linkages to the West may suffice to explain the consistency of 
the PAP's policies—that of the Singaporeans for Democracy (SFD), 
established in 2010. Led by an internationally-based Singaporean academic, 
the SFD worked closely with the United Nations Human Rights Council on 
the Universal Periodic Review process and stressed the maintenance of 
relationships with similar international nongovernmental organisations. It 
was dissolved in 2012 after protracted legislative obstacles to its registration 
presented by the PAP government. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
S. R. Joey Long once observed of Singapore that, "the notion of an island 
entity—geographically situated at one of the most important and strategic 
economic crossroads in the world—that is impervious to external influences 
and developments is conceptually limited and historically unrealistic" (2011: 
216). Regime change in Singapore cannot be understood without locating it 
at the international-domestic political interface. The theoretical framework 
provided by Levitsky and Way (2010) does just that. Unfortunately, the 
structural approach they have taken in the conceptualisation of linkages to 
the West has presented obstacles to a better understanding of why linkage to 
the West sometimes fails to raise the cost of authoritarianism. The analysis 
provided here helps us to rethink linkages to the West as inherently political 
by foregrounding the agency and process through which external pressure 
and influence are generated, minimised or precluded by state and nonstate 
actors that are an inherent part of these linkages. By reconceptualising 
linkages as sites of political interaction, we are better able to see more 
specifically how autocratic agency can mediate the impact of 
intergovernmental, economic, technocratic, informational, social and 
transnational civil society linkages to the West. Indeed, a closer examination 
of each dimension of Singapore's linkage to the West has revealed that not 
all dimensions of linkage have served to generate or channel external 
pressure or influence on the PAP government, depending on what policies 
and actions it has pursued. This observation suggests that a structural 
approach that treats linkage as mere channels of external democratising 
pressure or influence fails to give due attention to the politics of each 
dimension of linkage to the West. The agency-centred approach is arguably 
much truer to the purpose of Levitsky and Way's theoretical framework, 
which is meant to capture the international-domestic political interface of 
regime change (2010). The extent to which the claims made here are 
generalisable remains to be seen through other detailed studies of cases 
where linkages to the West have not led to democratisation. While this is 
beyond the scope of the present undertaking, rethinking linkage to the West 
in the way suggested here certainly opens up the research agenda in the field 
of regime change studies in a new direction not suggested by the current 
literature. 
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NOTES 
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feature articles to The Diplomat and other news media outlets. 
1  The increasingly popular opposition Workers Party, whose appeal to the electorate for 
a "First World Parliament" that could hold the PAP government accountable during 
the 2011 General Elections, further underlines the awareness Singaporeans have of 
Western liberal democratic institutions and their value, drawing comparisons with 
their own political institutions. 
2  According to the World Bank, foreign direct investment ranged around 6–14 percent 
of Singapore's GDP between 1980 and 1991 a comparatively high level amongst 
developing countries. World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/singapore 
(accessed 10 September 2015). 
3  US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights has consistently registered 
concerns over the use of the Internal Security Act in Singapore since 1975, along with 
increasing restrictions on press freedom and civil society and long-held political 
detainees. Human Rights organisations have also raised issues with long-held political 
detainees, and importantly reported on the subtle legalistic means through which 
political dissent has been muzzled in widely available reports. For example, when 
Amnesty International started reporting on Singapore in 1975, it raised concerns about 
how the Banishment Act was used to hold some detainees indefinitely without trial 
without having to resort to the Internal Security Act.   
4  See also Singapore and Malaysian British Association (SiMBA) Newsletter, 5 July 
1994, 3. SiMBA was a UK-based student organisation. 
5  In 2002, for example, Bloomberg paid large damages to the political leadership and 
issued a high profile public apology for suggesting the practice of nepotism in the top 
leadership ranks. In 2006, the Far East Economic Review was forced to pay 
US$290,000 to the Lee family in an out-of-court settlement for an allegedly 
defamatory article. 
6  The increasingly popular opposition Workers Party, whose appeal to the electorate for 
a "First World Parliament" that could hold the PAP government accountable during 
the 2011 General Elections, further underlines the awareness Singaporeans have of 
Western liberal democratic institutions and their value, drawing comparisons with 
their own political institutions. 
7 United States Congress House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Recent 
Developments in Malaysia and Singapore 1988: Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, 7 July 
and 22 September 1988 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1988). 
8  There is evidence that ASA and FUEMSSO had begun to make contact since 1981 
signalling a coalescing student movement abroad in the aftermath of attempts to 
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  suppress the student movement in Singapore in the mid-1970s. See Fijar No. 14 
October 1981, 14. Fijar was the monthly publication of FUEMMSO. 
9  See 2nd Press Statement, European Committee for Human Rights in Malaysia and 
Singapore, Brussels, 10 March 1989. 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Amnesty International. 1978. Amnesty International (AI) annual report 1978, 
index no. POL 10/001/1978 London, AI International Secretariat.  
Amnesty International charges torture of Singapore detainees. 1988. Associated 
Press, 22 August. 
Asian exemplar moves toward authoritarianism. 1988. New York Times, 12 May. 
Asian Human Rights Commission, International Commission of Jurists and 
International Federation of Human Rights. 1987. Report of the 
international mission of jurists to Singapore to investigate the arrest and 
detention of 22 persons in May and June 1987, Geneva, International 
Commission of Jurists. 
Barr, M. D. 2008. Singapore's catholic social activists: Alleged Marxist 
conspirators. In Paths not taken: Political pluralism in post-war Singapore, 
eds. Barr, M. D. and Trocki, C.A., 228–246. Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press. 
______. 2010. Marxists in Singapore? Lee Kuan Yew's campaign against Catholic 
social justice activists in the 1980s.  Critical Asian Studies 42: 335–362, 
DOI:10.1080/14672715.2010.507389 
Barr, M. D. and Skribis, Z. 2008. Constructing Singapore: Elitism, ethnicity and 
the nation-building project. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.   
Birdsall, N. et. al. 1993. The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public 
policy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Brownlee, J. 2007. Authoritarianism in an age of authoritarianism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Chua, B. H. 2000. The relative autonomies of the state and civil society. In State-
society relations, ed. Koh, G. and Ooi, G. L. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Collier, R. B. 1999. Paths toward democracy: The working class and elites in 
Western Europe and South America. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Cram, C. 2015. The UK can learn a lot from Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore. The 
Guardian, 4 April. 
Finegold, D., Wong, P.-K. and Cheah, T.-C. 2004. Adapting a foreign direct 
investment strategy to the knowledge economy: The case of Singapore's 
emerging biotechnology cluster. European Planning Studies 12: 921–941. 
 
 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1–29, 2016                                                      Linkage to the West 
26 
 Singapore is holding 12 in 'Marxist Conspiracy.' 1987. The New York Times, 21 
June.  
Four US littoral combat ships to operate out of Singapore by 2018. 2015. The 
Diplomat, 19 February.  
Geddes, B. 1999. What do we know about democratisation after twenty years? 
Annual Review of Political Science 2: 115–144, DOI: 10.1146/annurev. 
polisci.2.1.115.  
Gill, I., Huang Y. and Kharas, H. J. 2006. East Asian visions: Perspectives on 
economic development. Washington: World Bank. 
Gillis, K. E. 2005. Singapore civil society and British power. Singapore: Talisman 
Publishing. 
Goh, K. S. 1999. The economics of modernization. Singapore: Federal 
Publications. 
Guan, A. C. 2009. Singapore and the Vietnam War. Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 40: 353–384, DOI:10.1017/S0022463409000186. 
Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. 1995. The political economy of democratic 
transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
How I used the church. 1987. The Straits Times, 27 June.  
Howard, M. M. and Roessler, P.G. 2006. Liberalizing electoral outcomes in 
competitive authoritarian regimes. American Journal of Political Science 
50: 365–381, DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00189.x. 
Huff, W. G. 1994. The economic growth of Singapore: Trade and development in 
the twentieth century. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Huntington, S. P. 1991. The third wave: Democratisation in the late twentieth 
century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.  
International Mission of Jurists. 1987. Report of the international mission of 
jurists to Singapore 5–9 July 1987 to investigate the arrest and detention of 
22 persons on May and June 1987, Geneva. 
Johnson, C. 1982. MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 
1925–1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Khong, C. O. 1995. Singapore: Political legitimacy through managing conformity. 
In Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The quest for moral authority, ed. 
Alagappa, M, 108–135. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Koh, G. and Ooi, G. L. 2004. Relationship between state and civil society in 
Singapore: Clarifying the concepts, assessing the ground. In Civil society in 
Southeast Asia, ed.  Lee, H. G. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
Lee, T. 2005. Gestural politics: Civil society in "new" Singapore. Sojourn: 
Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 20: 132–154. 
Leifer, M. 1986. The Vietnam War and the response of Southeast Asian countries. 
Paper presented at 30th Anniversary International Conference, Japan 
Association of International Relations, 4–8 September. 
 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1–29, 2016                                                                  Su-Mei Ooi  
 
 
27 
 Leong Y. 2011. A brief history of the hub: Navigating between 'global' and 'asian.' 
In Singapore's knowledge economy discourse, eds. Heng, D. T. S. and 
Aljunied, S. M. K. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Levitsky, S. R. and Way, L. A. 2005. International linkage and democratisation. 
Journal of Democracy 16: 20–34, DOI:10.1353/jod.2005.0048. 
______. 2006. Linkage versus leverage: Rethinking the international dimension of 
regime change. Comparative Politics 38: 379–400, DOI:10.2307/20434008. 
______. 2007. Linkage, leverage and the post-communist divide. East European 
Politics and Societies 27: 48–66, DOI:10.1177/0888325406297134. 
______. 2010. Competitive authoritarianism: The origins and evolution of hybrid 
regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
______. 2012. Beyond patronage: Violent struggle, ruling party cohesion, and 
authoritarian durability. Perspectives on Politics 10: 869–889, 
DOI:10.1017/S1537592712002861. 
Lipset, S. M. 1959. Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development 
and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53: 69–105. 
Long J. S. R. 2011. Bringing the international and transnational back in: 
Singapore, decolonisation, and the Cold War, In Singapore in global 
history, eds. Heng, D. and Aljunied, S. M. K., 215–234. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press. 
Low, L. 1998. Political economy in a city-state: Government-made Singapore. 
Singapore: Oxford University Press.  
Marxism's chilling new theology. 1987. Straits Times, 20 August.  
Moore, B. 1966. Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant 
in the making of the modern world. Boston: Beacon Press. 
O'Grady, R. 1990. Banished: The expulsion of the Christian Conference of Asia 
from Singapore and its implications. Hong Kong: CCA International 
Affairs Committee.  
Ooi, S-M. 2009. The transnational protection regime and Taiwan's 
democratisation. Journal of East Asian Studies 9: 57–85. 
______. 2013. The transnational protection regime and democratic breakthrough 
in Taiwan and South Korea. Democratisation 2:  311–334, DOI:10.1080/ 
13510347.2012.729045. 
Operation Spectrum was political rape. 2009. The Online Citizen, 26 May. http:// 
www.theonlinecitizen.com/2009/05/operation-spectrum-was-political-rape/ 
(accessed 29 October 2015) 
Ortmann, S. 2011. Singapore: Authoritarian but newly competitive. Journal of 
Democracy 22: 153–164, DOI:10.1353/jod.2011.0066.  
Parig, D. 1984. Churches in contestation: Asian Christian social protest. New 
York: Orbis Books. 
Pereira, A. A. 2008. Wither the developmental state? Explaining Singapore's 
continued developmentalism. Third World Quarterly 29: 1189–1203. 
 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1–29, 2016                                                      Linkage to the West 
28 
 Pridham, G., Herring, E. and Sanford, G. 1994. Building democracy? The 
international dimension of democratisation in Eastern Europe. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
Rahim, L. S. 2009. Singapore in the Malay world: Building and breaching 
regional bridges. London: Routledge. 
Rerceretnam, M. 2006. The 1987 ISA arrests and international civil society: 
Responses to political repression in Singapore. The Copenhagen Journal of 
Asian Studies 23: 8–27.  
Richburg, K. B. 1987. Singapore fears surge in communal tensions; Race, religion 
issues simmer below surface. The Washington Post, 16 September. 
Rodan, G. 1989. The political economy of Singapore's industrialization: National 
state and international capital. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
______. 2004. Transparency and authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia: Singapore 
and Malaysia. London: Routledge. 
______. 2006. Singapore: Globalisation, the state and politics. In The political 
economy of Southeast Asia: Markets, power and contestation, eds. Rodan, 
G., Hewison, K. and Robison, R., 137–169. Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rodan, G. and Hewison, K. 2001. The political economy of South-East Asia: 
Conflict, crises, and change. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 
Rodan, G. and Jayasuriya, K. 2012. Hybrid regimes: A social foundations 
approach. In Routledge Handbook of Democratisation, ed. Haynes, J., 
175–189. London/New York: Routledge. 
Rueschemeyer, D., Stevens, H. E. and Stephens, J. D. 1992. Capitalist 
development and democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Seow, F. T. 1994. To catch a tartar: A dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's prison. New 
Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies. 
______. 1998. The media enthralled: Singapore revisited. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
Singapore braces to play host to IMF and the World Bank. 2006. New York Times, 
15 September. 
Sixteen are arrested for Marxist conspiracy. 1987. The Straits Times, 29 May. 
Slater, D. 2010. Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian 
Leviathans in Southeast Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
______. 2012. Strong-state democratisation in Malaysia and Singapore. Journal of 
Democracy 23: 19–33, DOI:10.1353/jod.2012.0021. 
Smith, B. B. 2005. Life of the party: The origins of regime breakdown and 
persistence under single-party rule. World Politics 57: 421–451. 
Tan, C. L. L. 2015. Pride and prejudice in modern Singapore. Foreign Policy, 24 
March. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/24/growing-up-in-lee-kuan-yews-
singapore/ (accessed 26 March 2015) 
Tan, E. S. 2004. Does class matter? Social stratification and orientations in 
Singapore. Singapore: World Scientific. 
 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1–29, 2016                                                                  Su-Mei Ooi  
 
 
29 
 Thomas, D. C. 2001. The Helsinki Effect: International norms, human rights, and 
the demise of communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Thompson, E. C. 2006. Singaporean exceptionalism and its implications for 
ASEAN regionalism. Contemporary Southeast Asia 28: 183–206.  
Trocki, C. A. 2006. Singapore: Wealth, power and the culture of control. London: 
Routledge.  
US State Department. 1982. Country reports on human rights practices for 1982. 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Whitehead, L. 2001. The international dimensions of democratisation: Europe 
and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Why different reactions to two sets of ISA arrests? 1987. The Straits Times, 27 
June.  
Woo-Cumings, M. 1999. The developmental state. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Zakaria, F. 1994. A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. Foreign Affairs 73:109–
126. 
